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Comments
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments
Law of Louisiana-Formal Requisites
of Negotiability
The Uniform Commercial Code is the result of seven years of
joint effort by the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.' The Code
is intended to cover the entire field of commercial transactions
1. For a detailed discussion of the preparation of the Code, see the
Comment, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS
EDITION 1 (1952). See also Richter, The Uniform Commercial Code-A Prei4ew, 24 CALIF. S.B.J. 414 (1949); Schnader, The New Commercial Code:
Modernizing Our Uniform Commercial Acts, 36 A.B.A.J. 179 (1950).
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and to replace the present laws in this field.2 It has been adopted
in Pennsylvania and is now under study by the New York legislature.4 The extensive discussion of the Code in legal periodicals 5
is indicative of the widespread interest which it has created. It
is not improbable that it will be proposed for adoption in Louisiana should it be enacted in the larger commercial states. The
effect of the adoption of the Code in Louisiana should therefore
be given serious consideration.
Article 3 of the Code, entitled Commercial Paper, is a "complete revision and modernization of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law" which has been the law of Louisiana for half
a century. It is the purpose of this comment to point out the
changes which the adoption of Article 3 will bring about in one
2. Article 2, Sales, replaces the Uniform Sales Act; Article 3, Commercial Paper, replaces the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, LA. R.S.
7:1 et seq. (1950); Article 4 deals with Bank Deposits and Collections;
Article 5 deals with Documentary Letters of Credit; Article 6 deals with
Bulk Transfers; Article 7, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other
Documents of Title, replaces the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, LA.
R.S. 54:1 et seq. (1950) and the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, LA. R.S.
45:901 et seq. (1950); Article 8, Investment Securities, replaces the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, LA. R.S. 12:521 et seq. (1950); Article 9, Secured Transactions, Sales of Accounts, Contract Rights and Chattel Paper, replaces
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
3. Pa. Laws 1953, No. 1, p. 3.
4. In 1954 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 461 (1954) the report of
the New York Law Revision Commission on its study of the new Code is
set forth.
5. For discussions of Article 3, Commercial Paper, see Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 8, and the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEr. L. REV. 531 (1951); Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability-The Negotiable Instruments Law Compared with the Proposed
Commercial Code, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1 (1953); Britton, Transfers and
Negotiations under the Negotiable Instruments Law and Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEXAS L. REV. 153 (1953); Cosway, Innovations
in Articles Three and Four of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 284 (1951); Emblidge, Commercial Paper under Proposed
Uniform Code, 23 N.Y.S.B.A. BULL. 371 (1951); Hill, How the Adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code Would Affect the Law of Negotiable Instruments
In Oregon, 32 ORE. L. REV. 97 (1953); Invernizzi, The Law of Negotiable
Instruments under the Proposed Commercial Code, 54 MD. S.B.A. 224 (1949);
Palmer, Negotiable Instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code, 48
MiCH. L. REV. 255 (1950); Sherman & Feeney, An Examination of the Negotiability Concept of the Uniform Commercial Code, [1953] WASH. U.L.Q.
297; Tisdale, Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper, 26 N.D. BAR
BRiEFS 252 (1950); Tyler, How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code would Affect the Law of Negotiable Instruments in Oregon, 33 ORE.
L. REV. 41 (1953); Note, Acceleration Clauses in Time Paper,under the NIL
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 101 U. OF PA. L. REV. 835 (1953); A Symposium of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 17 ALe. L. REV. 1 (1953);
Symposium, The Uniform Commercial Code in Ohio-Should Article 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code Be Adopted in Ohio?, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 32
(1953); Symposium, The Uniform Commercial Code-The Effect of Its
Adoption in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. Rsv. 776 (1953).
6. UCC § 3-101, comment.
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limited area of the Louisiana Negotiable Instruments Law-the
formal requisites of negotiability. No attempt is made here to
itemize every change of phraseology made by the Code; this
comment will discuss only those changes of substance which
appear to be most significant. 7 Louisiana cases will be discussed
wherever the Code is not in accord with the jurisprudence of
this state; otherwise the Code will merely be compared with the
NIL provisions.
Scope of Applicability
At the outset it will be helpful to compare the scope of
applicability of Article 3 with that of the NIL. The NIL provisions are intended to be the sole means of determining the
negotiability of any executory instrument which creates rights
in personam. This approach is expressed in NIL 1: "An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements: . .." Because of its broad applicability the NIL limits
the development and utility of instruments which might be
adapted to changing commercial usages by denying them any of
the attributes of negotiability.
".

Article 3 of the Code by the terms of Section 3-1039 does not
apply to money, documents of title or investment securities.
It is restricted to drafts (bills of exchange), checks, notes and
certificates of deposit.") In addition to this specific restriction
of Section 3-103, Section 3-104, which lists the formal requisites
of negotiability, provides that "Any writing to be a negotiable
instrument within this Article must . . . ." (Italics supplied.)
The comment following Section 3-104 interprets the words
"within this Article" as leaving open "the possibility that some
writings may be made negotiable by other statutes or by judicial
7. For brevity the present Louisiana Negotiable Instruments Law will
be referred to as NIL. The Uniform Commercial Code will be referred to
merely as the Code in the text and as UCC in the footnotes. All references

to sections or subsections, unless prefaced by NIL, will be to those of the
Code.

8. Under this language of the NIL there is the constant danger that

investment securities and documents of title not covered by specific statutes
may be held non-negotiable for failure to conform to the formal requirements of the NIL. E.g., Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E.
594 (1926), an instrument calling for the delivery of bonds held non-nego-

tiable because not payable in money.
9. "Section 3-103. Limitations on Scope of Article. (1) This Article
does not apply to money, documents of title or investment securities.

10. UCC § 3-103, comment 1.
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decision."" Professor Britton feels that the words indicate on
the part of the drafters a loss of faith in the legislative process
and will eliminate uniformity by encouraging the courts to experiment. 12 However, other writers have expressed the opinion,
which seems more sound, that the approach of the drafters will
provide a much needed flexibility so that new forms of negotiable
paper can be developed in the future and treated as such by the
courts independently of statutory enactments. 13
Requirement That an Instrument Must Contain a Promise or an
Order
Section 3-104(1): "Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this article must . . . (b) contain an unconditional
promise or order ....
Section 3-102(1) (b): "An 'order' is a direction to pay and
must be more than an authorization or request. It must identify
the person to pay with reasonable certainty. It may be addressed
to one or more such persons jointly or in the alternative but not
in succession."
Section 3-102 (1) (c): "A 'promise' is an undertaking to pay
and must be more than an acknowledgment of an obligation."
The Code retains the provision of NIL 114 that an instrument,
to be negotiable, must contain an order or a promise. To clarify
this requirement the Code defines "order" and "promise." The
definitions are, with slight exceptions, merely codifications of
the majority judicial interpretations of the NIL.' 5 One exception, which will effect a change in present law, is the provision
in the definition of an order that it may be addressed to persons
in the alternative. This provision is incorporated into the definition of a draft (bill of exchange) by Section 3-104(2) and will
therefore reverse the rule of NIL 12816 which does not permit a
11. UCC § 3-104, comment 1.

The Louisiana legislature has on at least

one occasion adopted the approach of declaring particular instruments
negotiable by statute. La. Acts 1951(E.S.), No. 17, p. 22, authorizing the
issuance of bonds payable out of a certain fund. The act provided that
the bonds "shall constitute negotiable instruments within the meaning of
[the NIL]."
12. Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability-The Negotiable Instruments Law Compared with the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 RocKy MT.
L. REV. 1 (1953).

13. Sherman & Feeney, An Examination of the Negotiability Concept
of the Uniform Commercial Code, [1953] Wash. U.L.Q. 297.
14. LA. R.S. 7:1 (1950).
15. For a discussion of what constitutes an order or a promise under
the NIL, see BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 41 (1943).
16. LA. R.S. 7:128 (1950).
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draft to be addressed to alternative drawees. The change is
included in recognition of "the practice of corporations issuing
dividend checks and of other drawers who for commercial convenience name a number of drawees, usually in different parts
of the country. '17
Requirement that the Promise or Order Must Be Unconditional
Section 3-104: "(1)

Any writing to be a negotiable instru-

ment within this Article must . . . (b) contain an unconditional
promise or order. . ....

Section 3-105: "(1) A promise of order otherwise unconditional is not made conditional by the fact that the instrument
"(a) is subject to implied or constructive conditions; or
"(b) states its consideration, whether performed or promised, or the transaction which gave rise to the instrument, or that
the promise or order is made or the instrument matures in
accordance with or 'as per' such transaction; or
"(c) refers to or states that it arises out of a separate agreement; or
"(d) states that it is drawn under a letter of credit; or
"(e) states that it is secured, whether by mortgage, reservation of title or otherwise; or
"(f) indicates a particular account to be debited or any
other fund or source from which reimbursement is expected; or
"(g) is limited to payment out of a particular fund or the
proceeds of a particular source, if the instrument is issued by a
government or governmental agency or unit; or
"(h) is limited to payment out of the entire assets of a partnership, unincorporated association, trust or estate by or on
behalf of which the instrument is issued.
"(2) A promise or order is not unconditional if the instrument
"(a) states that it is subject to or governed by any other
agreement; or
"(b) states that it is to be paid only out of a particular
fund or source except as provided in this section."
In Subsection (1) of 3-105 the drafters of the Code have
attempted to resolve conflicts and give clarity by spelling out in
17. TJCC § 3-102, comment 3.
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detail the generally accepted or majority interpretations of NIL
3.18 Most of the provisions are in accord with Louisiana decisions,
but in a few instances the law will be changed or clarified.
Several Louisiana cases have dealt with a promise to pay
followed by the words "as per" some particular agreement or
transaction. In Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Times Publishing Co.,' 9 the conclusion was reached that the words "as per
contract dated. .. 20 subjected the promise to the conditions
of the contract and rendered the note non-negotiable. A later
case, Tyler v. Whitney-Central Trust & Savings Bank,2' dealt
with a very similar note. 22 There, however, the court, on finding
that the "as per contract" phrase was in a separate sentence from
the promise, concluded that the phrase bore no relation whatever
to the promise, but was merely a statement of the transaction
giving rise to the note. The only real difference in the notes
involved in these cases was the position of the "as per contract"
stipulations in relation to the promises. This difference was in
all probability the result of pure accident. 23
Subsection 3-105 (1) (b) will make it unnecessary to draw
fine distinctions as to the meaning of an "as per contract" stipulation. Anyone handling a note containing these words can be
sure that, wherever located, they will not make an otherwise
unconditional promise conditional.
The provision of NIL 3 that an order or promise to pay out
of a particular fund is not unconditional is retained in Subsection
3-105 (2) (b). It is, however, modified by Subsections (1) (g)
18. LA. R.S. 7:3 (1950). The general problems covered by this NIL
section have been the subject of considerable litigation. Britton collects
many cases and discusses the problems.

BRITTON, BILLS AND

NOTES 47-86

(1943). Cases involving instruments which refer to separate agreements
or to the transactions giving rise to them, or which state their consideration are collected in a long series of annotations, the latest of which is
Note, 104 A.L.R. 1378 (1936). For cases involving notes secured by mortgages, see Note, 75 A.L.R. 1210 (1931); for cases involving notes with references to collateral security other than mortgages, see 102 A.L.R. 1095
(1936).
19. 142 La. 209, 76 So. 612 (1917).
20. The note read: "'I promise to pay to the order of myself one hundred fifty dollars . . . . rent for . . . brick building . . . in Shreveport, La.,
as per contract dated March 24, 1913." Id. at 210, 76 So. at 613.
21. 157 La. 249, 102 So. 325 (1924).
22. The note read: "'. . . we promise to pay to the order of ourselves
eighty-five and no/100 dollars ....
Value to be received in rent for store ...
as per lease this date.' " Id. at 252, 102 So. at 326.
23. Beutel, Common Law Judicial Technique and the Law of Negotiable
Instruments-Two Unfortunate Decisions, 9 TULANE L. REV. 64 (1934). See
also City Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilkinson, 165 La. 385, 115 So. 629
(1928), 4 TULANE L. REV. 126 (1929).
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and (1) (h). Subsection (1) (g), by treating as unconditional
the promise or order of a government agency or unit even if
limited to payment out of a particular fund, will reverse the
24
rule of such cases as Boxwell v. Department of Highways.
Because of the scarcity of litigation of instruments of the type
covered by Subsection (1) (h), the rule adopted by that subsection can be looked upon as a new rule of law, at least in Louisiana. 25 There seems to be no sound argument against the policy

of holding the instruments of partnerships, unincorporated associations, trusts and estates negotiable, particularly since Subsection (1) (h) is not intended to change the law as to the liability
26
of any party on such an instrument.
According to the comment following Section 3-105,2 Subsection (2) (a) retains the generally accepted rule that an instrument containing language such as "subject to the terms of contract dated . . ." is not negotiable. The Louisiana court fol-

lowed this rule in Gaines v. Fitzgibbons,28 but rejected it in
Newman v. Schwarz.2 9 In the latter case, in the court's opinion,
the words "Rent Note Subject to Terms of Lease Dated May 2,
1927" written across the face of the instrument did not refer to
the promise to pay. Therefore the note was held to be negotiable
in spite of the quoted language.
The adoption of the Code will eliminate the uncertainty
resulting from the decision in Newman v. Schwarz. Subsection
(2) expressly states that "if the instrument states that it is
subject to or governed by any other agreement," then the prom24. 203 La. 760, 14 So.2d 627 (1943) (warrants of Highway Commission
held non-negotiable because payable out of a particular fund).
25. No Louisiana cases could be found which dealt directly with the
negotiability of notes of the type covered by Subsection (1)(h). In Hibbs
v. Brown, 190 N.Y. 167, 82 N.E. 1108 (1907), a note, on which liability was
expressly restricted to the assets of an unincorporated association, was
held to be negotiable. See Note, 8 COL. L. REV. 215 (1908). In Charles Nelson
Co. v. Morton, 106 Cal. App. 144, 288 Pac. 845 (1930), 5 TULANE L. REV. 135,
a note made by the trustee of a business trust, on which liability was
restricted to the assets of the trust, was held negotiable. Contra: Lorimer
v. McGreevy, 229 Mo. App. 970, 84 S.W.2d 667 (1935). For general discussion,
see BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 58 (1943).

26. UCC § 3-105, comment 7.
27. Id. at comment 8.
28. 168 La. 260, 121 So. 763 (1929) (notes stating that they were "subject
to the conditions set forth in the act of sale," held non-negotiable). See
also Shushan v. Trepagnier, 187 La. 1012, 175 So. 651 (1937).
29. 180 La. 153, 156 So. 206 (1934), reversing Newman v. Schwarz, 153
So. 362 (La. App. 1934). For discussion, see Beutel, Common Law Judicial
Technique and the Law of Negotiable Instruments-Two Unfortunate Decisions, 9 TULANE L. Rsv. 64 (1934).
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This provision should add

Requirement that There Be No Promises or Orders Other Than
For the Payment of Money
Section 3-104: "(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must . . . (b) contain an unconditional
promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other
promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or
drawer except as authorized by this Article; ...."
Section 3-112: "(1)
not affected by

The negotiability of an instrument is

"(a) the omission of a statement of any consideration or of
the place where the instrument is drawn or payable; or
"(b) a statement that collateral has been given for the instrument or in case of default on the instrument the collateral
ma be sold; or
"(c)

a promise to give additional collateral on demand; or

"(d) a term authorizing a confession of judgment on the instrument if it is not paid when due; or
"(e) a term purporting to waive the benefit of any law
intended for the advantage or protection of any obligor; or
"(f) a term in a draft providing that the payee by indorsing
or cashing it acknowledges full satisfaction of an obligation of
the drawer.
"(2) Nothing in this section shall validate any term which
is otherwise illegal."
The last part of Section 3-104 (1) (b) retains the basic NIL
rule that an instrument must not contain an order or promise to
do any act other than the payment of money. The rule is expanded to prohibit not only an order or promise but also any
obligation or power given by the maker or drawer. This blanket
provision is greatly modified by Section 3-112, which is little
more than a rewording of NIL 5 and 6.31 A change of slight importance is the omission of any provision similar to that of NIL
30. Lack of clarity under the NIL is

illustrated in

Baldwin

Realty

Co. v. Interstate Trust & Banking Co., 172 La. 749, 135 So. 228 (1931), where
the decision commented upon the differing views of the court members as
to the effect of a statement in an instrument that it was "subject to the
terms" of a contract.
31. LA. R.S. 7:5-6 (1950).
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5 (4) .32 As a result, an instrument which allows the holder to
require that something be done in lieu of the payment of money
will no longer be negotiable.
In Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Dresser38 a promise to give
additional collateral on demand was considered a promise to do
something in addition to the payment of money and held to
render a note non-negotiable. Later Louisiana cases have held
notes containing similar provisions to be negotiable.8 4 Subsection 3-112 (1) (c), which has no NIL counterpart, will make it
clear that a promise of this kind will not destroy negotiability.
Requirement that the Promise Must Be for a Sum Certain
Section 3-104: "(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must . . . (b) contain an unconditional
promise or order to pay a sum certain. . ....
Section 3-106: "(1)
though it is to be paid

The sum payable is a sum certain even

"(a) with stated interest or by stated installments; or
"(b) with stated different rates of interest before and after
default or a specified date; or
"(c) with a stated discount or addition if paid before or
after the date fixed for payment; or
"(d) with exchange or less exchange, whether at a fixed
rate or at the current rate; or
"(e) with costs of collection or an attorney's fee or both
upon default.
"(2) Nothing in this section shall validate any term which
is otherwise illegal."
Section 3-107: ". . . . (2) A promise or order to pay a. stated
sum in a foreign currency is for a sum certain in money and,
unless a different medium of payment is specified in the instrument, may be satisfied by payment of that number of dollars
which the stated foreign currency will purchase at the buying
32. LA. R.S. 7:5 (1950):

"But the negotiable character of an instrument

otherwise negotiable is not affected by a provision which: . . . (4) Gives
the holder an election to require something to be done in lieu of payment of
money."
33. 132 La. 532, 61 So. 561 (1913).
34. Merchants & Marine Bank of Pascagoula, Miss. v. Hibernia Bank &
Trust Co., 16 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. La. 1936); Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank
v. Warner, 145 La. 1022, 83 So. 228 (1919); Bonart v. Rabito, 141 La. 970, 76
So. 166 (1917). See also In re Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co., 182 La.
421, 162 So. 31 (1935).
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sight rate for that currency on the day on which the instrument
is payable or, if payable on demand, on the day of demand. If
such an instrument specifies a foreign currency as the medium
of payment the instrument is payable in that currency."
Section 3-106 is the counterpart of NIL 2.35 Most of the slight
changes and additions to phraseology are not intended as substantive changes. 36 However, Subsections (1) (b) and (1) (c)
are new in the sense that there are no express provisions in the
NIL which correspond to them. They will settle the considerable
conflict of authority concerning varying rates of interest and
discounts. 37 The solutions reached by the drafters in favor of
negotiability seem to be entirely sound. A holder of an instrument containing the stipulations covered by Subsection (1) (b)
or (1) (c) can at any time determine from the face of the
instrument the exact amount then due.
The provision of NIL 2 (3)38 on acceleration clauses has been
omitted from Section 3-106. However, Section 3-109,39 which
deals with certainty as to time, validates all acceleration clauses,
and the comment following Section 3-106 states that the "disappearance of the language referred to in [NIL 2(3)] means
' ' 40
merely that it was regarded as surplusage.
Under Section 3-107 an instrument is for a sum certain even
though the sum is stated in terms of foreign currency and payment may be made in dollars. The fact that the exchange rate
may fluctuate from time to time does not affect negotiability.
Requirement that the Instrument Must Be Payable in Money
Section 3-104: "(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must .

.

. (b) contain an unconditional

promise or order to pay a sum certain in money.
7:2 (1950).
36. UCC § 3-106, comment: "Purposes of Changes: The new language is
intended to clarify doubts arising under the [NIL] ... "
37. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 233 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948);
BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 147 (1943). For discussion, see Bugea, Sum Certainty in Negotiable Paper as Affected by Interest and Discount Protsions,
2 LOYOLA L. REV. 1 (1943). No Louisiana cases could be found on this subject.
38. LA. R.S. 7:2 (1950): "The sum payable is a sum certain within the
meaning of this Chapter, although it is to be paid: . . . (3) By stated instalments, with a provision that upon default in payment of any instalment
or of interest, the whole shall become due ......
39. Section 3-109(1): "An instrument is payable at a definite time if by
Its terms it is payable . . . (c) at a definite time subject to any acceleration ......
40. UCC § 3-106, comment 4.
35. LA. R.S.
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Section 3-107: "(1) An instrument is payable in money if
the medium of exchange in which it is payable is money at the
time the instrument is made. An instrument payable in 'currency' or 'current funds' is payable in money.
"(2) A promise or order to pay a stated sum in a foreign
currency is for a sum certain in money and, unless a different
medium of payment is specified in the instrument, may be satisfied by payment of that number of dollars which the stated foreign currency will purchase at the buying sight rate for that
currency on the day on which the instrument is payable or, if
payable on demand, on the day of demand. If such an instrument
specifies a foreign currency as the medium of payment the instrument is payable in that currency."

'Money' means a medium of exchange
Section 1-201: ".....
authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government as
a part of its currency."
The NIL contains no definition of "money," and there are
various views as to what constitutes "money" in order for an
instrument to be negotiable. 41 The definition in Section 1-201
rejects both the view that money is limited to legal tender and
the view that it includes any medium of exchange commonly
used as money in a given community. Under the Code's definition "money" is any medium of exchange which is a part of the
official currency of a government.
The conflict concerning the negotiability of instruments
payable in "currency" or "current funds" is settled by Section
3-107(1) in accord with the majority of the decisions. 42 Such
instruments are "payable in money" and therefore negotiable.
Although, under the NIL, there is substantial authority
which follows the opposite rule,43 Section 3-107 (2) will make an
instrument negotiable even if 'it requires payment in foreign
currency and designates the place of payment in the United
States.
41. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 119 (1943).
42. Id. at 123-24; BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 300 (7th ed.,
Beutel, 1948).
43. Chafee, Progress of the Law-Bills and Notes, 33 HARV. L. REv. 255
(1920); Perkins, May a Promissory Note Be Payable in Foreign Money, 5
IOWA L. BULL. 227 (1920). But see Oliphant, The Theory of Money in the Law
of Commercial Instruments, 29 YALE L.J. 606 (1920). These articles are noted
under discussion in BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 128 (1943).
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Requirement as to Time of Payment
Section 3-104: "(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must . . . (c) be payable on demand
or at a definite time; ...."
(a) Demand Instruments
Section 3-108: "Instruments payable on demand include
those payable at sight or on presentation and those in which no
time for payment is stated."
As far as it goes Section 3-108 merely restates NIL 7.44 The
only change is the omission of the last sentence of NIL 7, which
reads: "Where an instrument is issued, accepted, or indorsed
when overdue, it is, as regards the person so issuing, accepting,
or endorsing it, payable on demand." This language gives the
impression that the requirements as to presentment, notice of
dishonor and protest, which are applicable in connection with
regular demand paper, are enforceable in favor of one who
endorses an instrument after its maturity. Section 3-501 provides
that one endorsing after maturity of the instrument is not
entitled to presentment, notice of dishonor or protest. Since the
impression created by the language of the last sentence of NIL
7 is definitely false under the new Code, the language is omitted.
(b) Instruments Payable at a Definite Time
Section 3-109: "(1) An instrument is payable at a definite
time if by its terms it is payable
"(a) on or before a stated date or at or a fixed period after
a stated date; or
"(b) at a fixed period after sight; or
"(c) at a definite time subject to any acceleration; or
"(d) at a definite time subject to extension at the option
of the holder, or to extension to a further definite time at the
option of the maker or automatically upon or after a specified
act or event.
"(2) An instrument which by its terms is otherwise payable
only upon an act or event uncertain as to time of occurrence is
not payable at a definite time even though the act or event has
occurred."
The phrase "definite time" is substituted in the Code for the
NIL words "fixed or determinable future time." The comment
44. LA. R.S. 7:7 (1950).
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following Section 3-109 states that "[t]he time of payment is
definite if it can be determined from the face of the instrument. '4 5 In this regard, Subsection 3-109(2) will reverse the
rule of NIL 4 (3) 46 which treats as negotiable an instrument payable "[o]n or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified
event, which is certain to happen, though the time of happening
be uncertain." Clearly such an instrument is not payable at a
47
definite time and is not negotiable under the Code.
Subsection 3-109(1) (c), dealing with acceleration clauses,
will clarify the present Louisiana law. In HiberniaBank & Trust
Co. v. Dresser,48 on rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that a provision in a note, giving the holder the right to demand
from the maker additional security satisfactory to the holder and
maturing the note on the maker's failure to comply with the
demand, rendered the note uncertain as to time of payment, and
therefore non-negotiable. Although the court held in Mechanics
& Metals Nat. Bank of New York v. Warner4 9 that an almost
identical provision did not render a note non-negotiable because
of uncertainty of time of payment, the Hibernia Bank case was
not overruled expressly. Any authority which the HiberniaBank
case now has as a precedent will be eliminated by the new
Code, which clearly follows the rule of the Mechanics & Metals
Nat. Bank case. The provision for immediate maturity of an
instrument on the maker's failure to supply additional collateral
is a form of acceleration clause. Section 3-109(1) (c) provides
that the certainty as to time of payment is not affected by any
acceleration. 50 Also, Section 3-112(1) (c) provides that negotiability is not affected by a promise to give additional collateral
on demand. In discussing this provision, the comment following
45. UCC § 1-109, comment 2.
46. LA. R.S. 7:4(3) (1950).

47. No recent Louisiana cases could be found dealing with this type of
instrument. The Code provision will reverse the rule of Mortee v. Edwards,
20 La. Ann. 236 (1868), which held that a note payable "thirty days after
peace between the Confederate States and the United States" was a negotiable instrument.
48. 132 La. 532, 61 So. 561 (1913).
49. 145 La. 1022, 83 So. 228 (1919).
50. UCC § 3-109, comment 4: "Objections to the acceleration clause must
be based rather on the possibility of abuse by the holder, which has nothing
to do with negotiability. . .

."

In

this connection reference should be made

to Section 1-208, which provides: "A term providing that one party may
accelerate payment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral not on stated contingencies but 'at will' or 'when he deems himself
insecure' or in words of similar import means that he has power to do so
only in the good faith belief that the prospect of payment or performance
is impaired but the burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party
against whom the power has been exercised."
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Section 3-112 states that such a promise is often accompanied by
a provision for acceleration in default of additional collateral,
"which is now permitted by [Section 3-109]."' 1
The provisions of Subsection 3-109 (1) (d) are apparently
52
It
based on the majority judicial interpretation of the NIL.
should be noted that a provision allowing extension of the time
of payment by the maker must state a definite time limit. Although this section apparently gives to the holder complete freedom to extend the date of payment indefinitely, the power of
the holder is greatly limited by Section 3-118 (f) which requires
the consent of the maker to any extension. That section also
provides that such consent, unless otherwise specified, authorizes
only a single extension for not longer than the original period
of the instrument.
Requirements that an Instrument Must Be Payable to Order or
Bearer
Section 3-104: "(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must . .. (d) be payable to order or
to bearer."
(a) Instruments payable to order.
"Section 3-110
"(1) An instrument is payable to order when by its terms
it is payable to the order or assigns of any person therein
specified with reasonable certainty, or to him or his order, or
when it is conspicuously designated on its face as 'exchange'
or the like and names a payee. It may be payable to the order of
"(a) the maker or drawer; or
"(b) the drawee; or
(c) a payee who is not maker, drawer or drawee; or
"(d) two or more payees together or in the alternative;
or
"(e) an estate, trust or fund, in which case it is payable
to the order of the representative of such estate, trust or fund
or his successors; or
"(f) an office or officer as such, in which case it is payable
to the order of the incumbent of the office or his successors; or
51. UCC § 3-112, comment 1.
52. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 274 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948);
BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 113 et

seq. (1943).
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"(g) a partnership or unincorporated association, in which
case it is payable to the partnership or association and may be
indorsed or transferred by any person thereto authorized.
"(2) An instrument not payable to order is not made so
payable by such words as 'payable upon return of this instrument properly indorsed.'
"(3) An instrument made payable both to order and to
bearer is payable to order unless the bearer words are handwritten or typewritten."
Section 3-110 contains the same substance as NIL 8.53 With
few exceptions the expansion or added detail is merely intended
to settle a specific conflict or to give needed clarity to the law.
In the first sentence the words "or assigns" are made words of
negotiability equivalent to "or order." Similarly, words such as
" 'exchange' or the like" are made words of negotiability. The
latter provision seems to allow the use of a wide range of words
to make an instrument negotiable. It should be noted, however,
that the Code contains no provision similar to NIL 10,54 which
allows the use of any terms "which clearly indicate an intention
to conform to the requirements" of the NIL. In the comment
following Section 3-104, it is stated that the omission of a provision similar to NIL. 10 means "that either the language of the section or a clear equivalent must be found, and that in doubtful
cases the decision should be against negotiability." 55
The words "payable upon return of this instrument properly
indorsed" are frequently contained in certificates of deposit. Subsection (2) settles the conflict which exists under the NIL5 6 by
providing that these words, standing alone, do not make the
instrument order paper. The omission of the word "order" or
its clear equivalent is to be considered as indicating an intention
that the instrument be non-negotiable.
Subsection (3) is directed towards those instruments which
are prepared by filling in the blanks in a printed form. The comment states that language such as "Pay to the order of John Doe
or bearer" usually results from a maker's overlooking the printed
words "or bearer" when filling in the payee blank.5 7 For this
53. LA. R.S. 7:8 (1950).
54. LA. R.S. 7:10 (1950).
55. UCC § 3-104, comment 5.
56. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 37

INSTRUMENTS

(1943).
57. UCC § 3-110, comment 6.
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230 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948);
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reason, the words "or bearer" are controlling only when handwritten or typewritten.
(b) Instruments payable to bearer.
Section 3-111. "An instrument is payable to bearer when by
its terms it is payable to
"(a) bearer or the order of bearer; or
"(b) a specified person or bearer; or
"(c) 'cash' or the order of 'cash,' or any other indication
which does not purport to designate a specific payee."
Along with Subsection 3-110 (3), Subsection 3-111 (a) is directed toward instruments prepared by filling in the blanks on a
printed form. When the drawer or maker writes the word
"bearer" in the payee blank of a form containing the words "Pay
to the order of
," it is logical to give effect to the word
consciously included by the maker or drawer. This is the result
intended by Subsection (a), which makes such an instrument
bearer paper.
Subsections (3) and (5) of NIL 9,58 the article corresponding to Section 3-111, have been omitted from this section, but
are covered elsewhere in Article 3.59
Subsection (c) rewords NIL 9(4). The purpose of the rewording can be determined only by reading the comment following the section, which states that the rewording is to "remove
any possible implication that 'Pay to the order of

_

makes the instrument payable to bearer. It is an incomplete
order instrument ....

-6o A further rewording of Subsection (c)

seems to be needed if its stated purpose is to be accomplished.
Conclusion
In general, Part I of Article 3 of the new Code should be
an improvement over that part of the NIL dealing with the formal requisites of negotiability.
The Code's approach to the concept of negotiability will provide needed flexibility so that new types of instruments can be
developed in conformity with changing commercial practices.
Basically, the formal requisites of negotiability as set forth
in the Code are identical with those of the NIL. The improve58. LA. R.S. 7:9 (1950).
59. UCC § § 3-405, 3-204.

60. UCC § 3-111, comment 2.
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ment will come in the clarification of uncertainties which have
been evidenced by conflicting jurisprudence over the past half
century. In nearly all areas of uncertainty the drafters of the
Code have adopted the rules followed by the majority of the
courts. As Louisiana has in most cases settled questions arising
under the NIL in accord with the weight of judicial authority,
the Code will affect few substantive changes in the law of this
state.
The adoption of the Code will result in greater uniformity
as to the formal requisites of negotiability than is now present
under the NIL. It is submitted that there is nothing contained
in Part I of Article 3 which should preclude its adoption in
Louisiana, and the clarification which it will provide in many
questions will be a definite improvement over the present law.
Sidney B. Galloway

The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform

Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments
Law of Louisiana-Rights of a Holder
The Holder in Due Course
A fundamental concept in the law of negotiable instruments
is the legal protection which accompanies the status of holder in
due course. This protection allows the holder in due course, generally termed a good faith purchaser, to enforce the obligation
represented by the instrument regardless of the fact that the
drawer or maker may have a valid defense against the party
with whom he dealt.' By thus cutting off defenses available between the immediate parties to the instrument the law provides
a vital element of certainty in commercial paper transactions.
Under the provisions of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code
the holder in due course will still be afforded this legal protection; however, certain innovations and modifications have
been made in the requirements for the holder in due course
status.
1. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

LAW §§ 57, 58.

